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ABSTRACT. In this essay reviewing Brian Leiter’s recent book Naturalizing
Jurisprudence, I focus on two positions that distinguish Leiter’s reading of the
American legal realists from those offered in the past. The first is his claim that the
realists thought the law is only locally indeterminate – primarily in cases that are
appealed. The second is his claim that they did not offer a prediction theory of law,
but were instead committed to a standard positivist theory. Leiter’s reading is
vulnerable, because he fails to discuss in detail those passages from the realists that
inspired past interpretations. My goal is to see how Leiter’s reading fares when
these passages are considered. I argue that Leiter is right that the realists’ indeterminacy thesis has only a local scope. Those passages that appear to claim that
the law is globally indeterminate actually address three other topics: judicial
supremacy, judges’ roles as finders of fact, and the moral obligation to adjudicate
as the law commands. With respect to the prediction theory, however, I conclude
that Leiter’s position cannot be defended. Indeed the realists offered two ‘prediction’ theories of law. According to the first, which is best described as a decision
theory, the law concerning an event is whatever concrete judgment a court will
issue when the event is litigated. According to the second, the law is reduced, not
to concrete judgments, but to regularities of judicial (and other official) behavior in
a jurisdiction. I end this essay with the suggestion that the realists’ advocacy of the
second prediction theory indirectly vindicates Leiter’s reading of the realists as
prescient jurisprudential naturalists.

Most closely associated with the influential twentieth-century philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine, naturalism has emerged as a
significant movement in contemporary philosophy. In Naturalizing
Jurisprudence,1 Brian Leiter explores how the naturalistic turn might
be applied to the philosophy of law.2 Previously published, these
1
Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal
Philosophy (2007). All citations to Leiter’s book will be in parentheses embedded in the text.
2
‘Philosophy of law’ is understood here broadly, for the seventh and eighth essays are concerned
with the proper place, if any, of moral facts within a naturalistic framework.
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essays have already had an important effect on the field. In addition
to inspiring a debate among philosophers of law concerning their
reliance on conceptual analysis,3 Leiter has also encouraged them to
think more searchingly about how a normative theory of adjudication – a theory of how judges ought (legally) to decide cases – should,
or can, fit within social-scientific accounts of the actual causes of
judicial decisions.4
My focus, however, is on the first third of the book, in which he
presents a novel and sympathetic reading of the American legal
realists.5 I will concentrate on two positions that distinguish Leiter’s
reading from those offered in the past. The first is his claim that the
realists thought the law is only locally indeterminate – primarily in
cases that are appealed. The second is his claim that they did not
offer a prediction theory of law, but were instead committed to a
standard positivist theory.
Leiter is to be praised for seeking a more reasonable reading of
the realists in these two areas, for it is precisely here that philosophers of law have dismissed the realists as hopelessly confused. The
realists may have been philosophically naïve,6 but they were not
idiots, and it is unlikely that their considered views were as absurd as
they have been made out to be. But Leiter’s reading is vulnerable,
because he fails to discuss in detail those passages from the realists
that inspired the interpretations he criticizes. My goal is to see how
Leiter’s reading fares when these passages are considered.
I will argue that Leiter is right that the realists’ indeterminacy
thesis has only a local scope. Those passages that appear to claim
that the law is globally indeterminate actually address three other
topics: judicial supremacy, judges’ roles as finders of fact, and the
moral obligation to adjudicate as the law commands.
With respect to the prediction theory, however, I conclude that
Leiter’s position cannot be defended. Indeed the realists offered two
‘prediction’ theories of law. According to the first, which is best
3
See, e.g., Julie Dickson, ‘Methodology in Jurisprudence: A Critical Survey’, Legal Theory 10 (2004):
117, 133–141.
4
See, e.g., Leslie Green, ‘Law and the Causes of Judicial Decision’, available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1374608.
5
Although just who should be labeled a realist is a matter of some dispute, I will use Leiter’s list of
those most commonly thought to be members of the movement: Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank,
Underhill Moore, Felix Cohen, Leon Green, Herman Oliphant, Walter Wheeler Cook, Max Radin,
Hessel Yntema, and Joseph Hutcheson (16, 61).
6
One of them clearly was not. Felix Cohen had a Ph.D. in philosophy from Harvard.
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described as a decision theory of law, the law concerning an event is
whatever concrete judgment a court will issue when the event is
litigated. The decision theory is most evident in Jerome Frank’s
writings (although he subsequently came to regret having advocated
it). According to the second, which is most clearly presented by Felix
Cohen and Walter Wheeler Cook, the law is reduced, not to concrete judgments, but to regularities of judicial (and other official)
behavior in a jurisdiction. The theory is broadly positivist, and indeed was presented by the realists in opposition to the prevailing
natural law tradition. It remains non-standard, however, because it
appears to identify as law those norms that are regular determinants
of judicial decisions, whether or not they satisfy the officially-accepted criteria for law in the jurisdiction. I end this essay with the
suggestion that the realists’ advocacy of a prediction theory of law
indirectly vindicates Leiter’s reading of the realists as prescient
jurisprudential naturalists.
I. THE SCOPE OF LEGAL INDETERMINACY

A. The Core Claim and the Received View
For Leiter, the ‘Core Claim’ of legal realism is that ‘judges respond
primarily to the stimulus of facts’ rather than to the applicable rules of
law (21, see also 16, 22, 89–90, 109). Since applying legal rules requires
sensitivity to the facts of the case, one might wonder why responsiveness to facts and responsiveness to legal rules exclude one
another. But Leiter clarifies that by ‘facts’ he means non-legal facts –
that is, ‘facts that are not made relevant by any legal rule’ (22, n. 33).
An alternative, and perhaps less misleading, formulation of the Core
Claim is ‘that judges are (primarily) responsive to non-legal reasons’
(24) – such as fairness to the parties. It is these non-legal reasons that
make facts, in Leiter’s sense of the term, relevant to judges’ decisions.
Leiter argues that the realists accepted the Core Claim because
the law is rationally indeterminate. The law is rationally indeterminate
in a decision situation if the class of legal reasons – that is, ‘those
reasons a court may properly give in justifying its decision’7 – ‘is
7
Legal reasons include not merely legitimate sources of law (such as constitutional provisions,
statutes and court decisions), but also legitimate means of interpreting these sources, of characterizing
the facts of the case in terms of their legal significance, and of reasoning with legal rules and legally
described facts (9).
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insufficient to justify only one outcome in that case’ (9). An alternative explanation of why judges decide on the basis of non-legal
rather than legal reasons is that they simply ignore the latter, for
example, due to irrationality, dishonesty, or incompetence (10). In
other words, the relevant indeterminacy of the law might be causal
rather than rational (9). Although he grants that some realists –
Jerome Frank in particular – emphasized the law’s causal indeterminacy,8 Leiter takes the Core Claim to be primarily based upon its
rational indeterminacy.
Although the prevailing interpretation of legal realism (which
Leiter calls the ‘Received View’ of the movement) also attributes the
Core Claim to the realists, it offers a particular version of the Claim.
According to the Received View:
Legal Realism is fundamentally: (1) a descriptive theory about the nature of judicial
decisions, according to which, (2) judges exercise unfettered discretion, in order (3)
to reach results based on their personal tastes and values, which (4) they then
rationalize after-the-fact with appropriate legal rules and reasons. (16)

Leiter does not question theses (1) and (4). But he challenges
theses (2) and (3) – the ‘Judicial Volition’ thesis that judges exercise
unfettered discretion and the ‘Judicial Idiosyncrasy’ thesis that their
decisions are based on personal tastes and values (16, 25).
Leiter’s critique of the Judicial Idiosyncrasy thesis is persuasive.
He grants that there was an ‘Idiosyncrasy Wing’ of legal realism –
whose most prominent member was Jerome Frank (28).9 But for the
members of the larger ‘Sociological Wing’, legal decisions in cases
‘fall into discernable patterns’ (62). Judges respond predictably to
situation-types on the basis of shared perceptions of fairness.
Indeed, if all the realists accepted the Judicial Idiosyncrasy thesis,
two of their signature programs would lapse into incoherence. Many
realists sought to apply the methods of the social sciences to adjudication in order to accurately predict judicial behavior (62–65). If
they were all members of the Idiosyncrasy Wing, they would have
thought that no meaningful predictions – beyond those applicable to
individual judges – are possible (25).

8
Brian Leiter, ‘Legal Realism’, in Dennis Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal
Theory (1996), p. 261 at 268.
9
Another member of the Wing was Joseph Hutcheson (28).
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In addition, some realists sought to reform the law by incorporating into legal rules the non-legal considerations that drive judicial
decision-making. One example, familiar to any first-year civil procedure student, is the transformation of the law of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.10 Traditionally a company incorporated under the laws
of a sister state was amenable to personal jurisdiction if it was
‘present’ within the forum state.11 Because a corporation supervenes
upon entities that can indeed occur within the forum, if the presence
of any such entity (for example, a single corporate employee) were
sufficient for personal jurisdiction, the traditional approach would
provide a determinate legal rule. But the presence of one such entity
was not enough. Only a sufficiently pervasive level of contact constituted corporate presence. Because the criterion of presence gave
judges no real guidance on how much contact was enough, they
ultimately decided on the basis of non-legal considerations, which
included, as Felix Cohen put it, ‘the difficulties that injured plaintiffs
may encounter if they have to bring suit against corporate defendants in the state of incorporation’ and ‘the possible hardship to
corporations of having to defend actions in many states’.12 In International Shoe and subsequent cases,13 these non-legal considerations
were incorporated into the applicable legal rule. Such reform would
not be possible if no meaningful regularities could be found among
judges deciding personal jurisdiction cases.
On the other hand, just what the Judicial Volition thesis is, and
why it is misguided, are less clear. What does it mean to say that
judges exercise ‘unfettered’ discretion? Leiter identifies two fetters:
the legal reasons for a decision and the decision’s ‘causal determinants’ (26, n. 57). With respect to the first fetters, he says, the thesis
is accurate: ‘The Received View claims that the Realists believe there
are no fetters on judicial decisions in the sense of fetters qua legal
reasons. All the Realists do, in fact, accept this part of the Received
10
326 U.S. 310, 316–319 (1945). See George Rutherglen, ‘International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal
Realism’, Supreme Court Review (2001): 347, 349–350; Logan Everett Sawyer III, ‘Jurisdiction, Jurisprudence, and Legal Change: Sociological Jurisprudence and the Road to International Shoe’, George Mason
Law Review 10 (2001): 59. Leiter’s preferred example (30) is Llewellyn’s inclusion of an obligation of
good faith in Article 2 of the U.C.C. E.g. U.C.C. § 2–103(j).
11
See, e.g., Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917).
12
Felix S. Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’, Columbia Law Review 35
(1935): 809, 810.
13
See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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View, so understood’ (ibid.). But the thesis is mistaken concerning
the second fetters. The realists reject ‘the claim that there are not
fetters qua causal determinants of these decisions; thus, most Realists
reject the image of judges as having unbounded volition in deciding
cases – precisely the image that many writers infer from the
Received View’ (ibid.). Indeed, with respect to the second fetters, the
Judicial Volition thesis is mistaken even concerning Frank: ‘[F]or
Frank, judicial decisions are determined, so that, in reality, there is no
room for judicial choice. It is just that both judges themselves, and
we as observers of their behavior, will find it hard, if not impossible,
to identify the determinants’ (26, n. 59).
It appears, therefore, that the objectionable element in the Judicial
Volition thesis is its incompatibilist libertarianism – the view that
judges decide cases free from causal determinants.14 I see no evidence of the thesis, so understood, in the examples of the Received
View quoted by Leiter (15–16). These passages attribute to the
realists the view that judges decide on the basis of ‘personal values’
(15), rather than legal reasons. They take no stand on whether the
realists thought that these personal values are themselves caused.15
Another puzzle concerning the Judicial Volition thesis has to do
with the first fetters. Although Leiter says that ‘[a]ll the realists do, in
fact, accept’ the part of the thesis that claims that ‘there are no fetters
on judicial decisions in the sense of fetters qua legal reasons’ (26,
n. 57), this cannot be his considered view. As we have seen, the Core
Claim of legal realism is that judges primarily respond to non-legal
reasons (21, 24), not that they only respond to such reasons. But if
they respond to legal reasons to some extent, there are indeed some
‘fetters qua legal reasons’ on judicial decisions (26, n. 57).
What is more, Leiter elsewhere argues that the realists did not
even think that judges primarily respond to non-legal reasons. One of
the defects he sees in past interpretations – particularly those offered
14
Leiter’s position here is not easy to discern, because he speaks of this incompatibilist libertarianism not as part of the Judicial Volition thesis (which is itself part of the Received View), but only as
something ‘many writers infer from the Received View’ (26, n. 57, italics mine). But if it is not part of
the Judicial Volition thesis, then Leiter has no objection to the thesis at all.
15
The only passage that might suggest incompatibilist libertarianism is by Fred Schauer, which
describes the realists as holding ‘that legal decision-makers are largely unconstrained by forces external
to their own decision-making preferences’. Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical
Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1991), p. 191. But an examination of the
context in which the passage occurs shows that Schauer is not concerned with whether the realists
thought judges’ decision-making preferences are themselves externally caused.
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by members of the critical legal studies movement – is that the
realists are treated as having made exaggerated claims about the
law’s indeterminacy (19–20, 41). The realists, Leiter argues, ‘did not
generally view the law as ‘globally’ indeterminate, that is, as indeterminate in all cases’ (19).16 They saw indeterminacy as primarily
extending only to ‘the stage of appellate review’ (77, see also 23, 41,
77–79, 107–108, 110–111, 115–116). Cases that reach appeal are the
minority of those litigated.17
In the light of these puzzles, it is tempting to read the Judicial
Volition thesis as the misguided view that judges are free of fetters
qua legal reasons. But whether or not this mistake is read into the
thesis, it is clear that Leiter thinks that past interpretations have
exaggerated the scope of the realists’ indeterminacy claims. The
realists are best understood as ‘claim[ing] that the class of legal
reasons underdetermines the outcome in cases that reach the stage
of appellate review’ (107).
B. Leiter’s Argument for the Appellate Limitation
In the end, Leiter offers three arguments for the appellate limitation.
First of all, the evidence of indeterminacy that the realists offered
was overwhelmingly drawn from appellate opinions (108). But it is
not clear how much can be drawn from this fact, since the realist
Karl Llewellyn offers an alternative explanation for a reliance on
appeals. He concentrates on appeals, he admits, because they offer a
‘convenient source of information’ about judicial reasoning.18
16
To say that indeterminacy is local is not to say that it is a marginal phenomenon, as H.L.A. Hart
argued. For Hart, the realists’ indeterminacy claims relied upon the ‘open texture’ of the language by
means of which the law is formulated. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed. 1994), p. 123. So
understood, indeterminacy is a problem only concerning items falling in the penumbra of a legal term
(e.g., whether a bicycle falls under a regulation prohibiting ‘vehicles’ in a park). Ibid. at 126. With
respect to the many core cases that clearly fall within the extension of a term (e.g., whether a motor-car
falls under the regulation), the law will guide a judge to a unique result.
Leiter argues that Hart misidentified the realists’ primary argument for the law’s indeterminacy. It
had its source ‘not in general features of language itself, but in the existence of equally legitimate, but
conflicting, canons of interpretation that courts could employ to extract differing rules from the same
statutory text or the same precedent’ (74). This ‘move[d] indeterminacy from the margin to the center
of cases actually litigated’ (76). Nevertheless, the realists’ indeterminacy thesis was not global because
they never argued that legal reasons fail to recommend ‘a unique outcome in all cases; rather it fails to
do so … in a particular range of cases (e.g., the cases that reach the stage of appellate review)’ (41).
17
Theodore Eisenberg, ‘Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further
Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes’, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 1 (2004): 659, 685
(‘About 20% of cases with definitive trial court judgments generate appeals’).
18
Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study (1930), p. 102.
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The second argument appeals to passages in which the realists
appear to put an explicit limit on the scope of their indeterminacy
claims. Leiter particularly relies upon two.19 In the first, Llewellyn
states that indeterminacy applies to ‘any case doubtful enough to
make litigation respectable’.20 In the second, Max Radin notes that
judicial ‘decisions will [] be called for chiefly in what may be called
marginal cases, in which prognosis is difficult and uncertain. It is this
fact that makes the entire body of legal judgments seem less stable
than it really is’.21
In fact, the quotation from Radin is arguably compatible with
global indeterminacy. He claims that decision will be called for only in
cases in which prognosis is difficult. Prognosis might be easy even if the
law is indeterminate, since, as Leiter himself emphasizes, the outcome
of a case can be predictable due to the influence of non-legal considerations. What is more, even if both passages are understood as
rejecting global indeterminacy, they appear compatible with indeterminacy extending well beyond appeals, to all cases that are actually
litigated. After all, they speak of indeterminacy as existing in cases in
which litigation is respectable and in which decisions are called for.22
Leiter’s third argument is, in the end, the most compelling. Since
it is manifestly false that legal indeterminacy is global, charity of
interpretation recommends reading the realists’ indeterminacy
claims as local. Consider Jones, who entered into a contract to sell
Blackacre to Smith. Smith refuses to pay and to take possession of
the property and Jones sues him for breach of contract. If the
applicable statute of frauds says that a contract to sell real property is
not enforceable if not in writing, and the jury finds that the contract
was not written, then the set of legal reasons justify a unique
19

Leiter refers to these two passages as evidence of the appellate limitation twice in the book (20, n.
25 and 77–78). In my own research, I was able to find one other passage from a realist that suggests the
appellate limitation. Felix Cohen speculates that ‘‘a preoccupation with the ‘hard cases’ of law which are
sent to appellate courts for review and which alone fill the bulk of our reports, case-books, and treatises,
has seriously distorted the views of some contemporary ‘realists’’’. Felix S. Cohen, Ethical Systems and
Legal Ideals: An Essay on the Foundations of Legal Criticism (1933), p. 238. But this passage is not that
helpful for Leiter, since Cohen clearly thinks that other realists made broader claims about legal
indeterminacy.
20
Karl N. Llewellyn, ‘Some Realism about Realism – Responding to Dean Pound’, Harvard Law
Review 44 (1931): 1222, 1239.
21
Max Radin, ‘In Defense of an Unsystematic Science of Law’, Yale Law Journal 51 (1942): 1269, 1271.
22
Leiter also points to passages in which the realists argue that legal rules play some role in decisions
(78). But that is compatible with indeterminacy being global. Legal rules could have this influence by
narrowing the set of available decisions, while always leaving the choice within that set indeterminate.
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decision – judgment for Smith. Nor is this a type of case that would
never be actually litigated. The dispute between Jones and Smith
might be over the facts of the case – namely whether the contract
was in writing – not the legal consequences of the facts. Since none
of this could possibly have been news to the realists, they could not
have made global indeterminacy claims.
The puzzle is that there are many passages, ignored by Leiter,
that appear to claim that legal indeterminacy is indeed a global
phenomenon. For example, Frank often argues that judges always
have discretion:
[T]ry as men will to avoid it, judging involves discretion and individualization. The
judge, in determining what is the law of the case, must choose and select, and it is
virtually impossible to delimit the range of his choice and selection.23

Judicial discretion, Frank argues, is ‘unavoidable’24 and occurs ‘in
almost all cases’.25 To claim that a judge has discretion suggests that
the law is indeterminate. If judicial discretion is a global phenomenon, it seems that legal indeterminacy is as well.
Leiter unnecessarily weakens his argument by failing to explain
what the realists meant in such passages. I will argue that they were
concerned with three issues – each distinct from the question of legal
indeterminacy as defined by Leiter.
C. Judicial Supremacy
The first is judicial supremacy. Assume that the law is rationally
determinate, in the sense that it identifies a unique decision to a
judge. It does not follow that if the judge fails to issue that decision
her judgment is not binding. Indeed, virtually everyone agrees that
in the American legal system judgments are binding even if the court
misapplied or misinterpreted the law.26 If the judge entertaining the
23

Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 149 (Anchor Books ed. 1963, originally published 1930).
Ibid. at 399.
25
Ibid. at 398.
26
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, ‘Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments’, Cardozo Law Review 15 (1993): 43, 46; Michael Stokes Paulsen, ‘The Merryman Power and the
Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation’, Cardozo Law Review 15 (1993): 81, 82;
Edwin Meese III, ‘The Law of the Constitution’, Tulane Law Review 61 (1987): 979, 988–989; Larry D.
Kramer, ‘The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court’, Harvard Law Review 115 (2001):
4, 8. The sole exception I am aware of is Michael Stokes Paulsen, ‘The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is’, Georgetown Law Journal 83 (1994): 217, 276–284.
24
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case of Jones v. Smith ignored the plain language of the statute of
frauds and entered a judgment for Jones, despite the jury’s finding
that the contract was not in writing, the judgment would have to be
enforced. Of course, it could be overturned on appeal. But the fact
that this step is necessary demonstrates the judgment’s binding
nature. Furthermore, if affirmed by the highest court of appeals, it
will be binding permanently, unless it is abrogated by legislative
action.
To be sure, in certain cases a judge’s legal error will render her
judgment a legal nullity that may be ignored by officials even if it has
not been overturned on appeal. To take an extreme example, consider a federal district court judge who, in a temporarily deranged
state, issues a ‘judgment’, in the absence of any filed lawsuit, that she
is entitled to a $100,000 raise. Officials do not have to wait until the
judgment is overturned on appeal to refuse to enforce it. There are,
one might say, legal criteria for a decision being a judgment at all –
and concerning these criteria judicial supremacy does not apply.27 It
is also probable that a wildly unreasonable application of the law
might render a decision a legal nullity. For example, if the court in
Jones v. Smith issued a judgment that Jones’s failure to satisfy the
statute of frauds required him to be summarily executed, officials
would be legally permitted (or required) to ignore it, without
waiting for appellate review. Nevertheless the simple fact that a
judgment involved the misapplication or misinterpretation of the
law is not on its own sufficient for officials to deny it legal effect.
Notice that the judicial supremacy identified here is weak – it
extends only to concrete decisions applying to the parties, for
example, the judgment that Smith owes Jones a certain amount of
money. Judicial supremacy would exist in a stronger sense if any
interpretation of the law in a court’s written opinion is binding upon
other officials going forward, in the sense that they are obligated to
conform their behavior to the interpretation in circumstances
unrelated to the concrete case in which it was articulated. It is likely
that strong judicial supremacy also exists, at least to some extent, in
the American legal system, for example, with respect to Supreme

27
Michael Steven Green, ‘Legal Revolutions: Six Mistakes About Discontinuity in the Legal Order’,
North Carolina Law Review 83 (2005): 331, 393–394 & n. 165.
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Court interpretations of the Constitution,28 although whether it
should exist is a matter of some debate.29
The difference between weak and strong judicial supremacy can
be highlighted by considering the role of an umpire in baseball.
Umpires have weak supremacy. Players in the game are bound to
accept an umpire’s concrete call that a pitch is a strike, even if the
call is in error. But umpires do not have strong supremacy. Players
are not bound to accept an umpire’s interpretation of the rules of
baseball in circumstances unrelated to any concrete call.
Thus when Frank argues that ‘‘no legal rule [] is ‘discretionproof’’’,30 the discretion being referred need not have its source in
the legal indeterminacy with which Leiter is concerned – that is, the
failure of legal rules to identify to the judge a unique decision. It may
instead rest on the judge’s power to issue a binding judgment in
defiance of determinate legal rules. Of course, Hart famously argued
that judges do not have legal discretion simply because they have
supremacy.31 The fact that their judgments are binding if they ignore
legal rules does not mean that they lack a legal duty to adjudicate in
accordance with these rules. Determining the exact relationship
between legal rules and judicial supremacy may be more difficult
than Hart suggests.32 But even if Hart was right, and the realists read
too much into the phenomenon of judicial supremacy, the important
point for our purposes is that their position is not contrary to Leiter’s
moderate reading of their indeterminacy thesis.
D. Fact-Skepticism
Fact-skepticism is another reason that the realists claimed that judges
always have discretion. Here is Frank:
28
Ibid. at 394–395. The Supreme Court declared that its constitutional rulings are binding in this
stronger sense in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
29
See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999); Robert C. Post, ‘The
Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law’,
Harvard Law Review 117 (2003): 4; Larry D. Kramer, ‘Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004’, California
Law Review 92 (2004): 959, 959; Meese, supra note 26; Paulsen, supra note 26.
30
Jerome Frank, ‘‘‘Short of Sickness and Death’’: A Study of Moral Responsibility in Legal Criticism’, New York University Law Review 26 (1951): 545, 582.
31
Hart, supra note 16, at 141–147.
32
For a recent argument to this effect, see Kenneth Einar Himma, ‘Understanding the Relationship
Between the U.S. Constitution and the Conventional Rule of Recognition’, in Matthew D. Adler and
Kenneth E. Himma (eds.), The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution (2009), p. 95. Himma
concentrates on strong judicial supremacy.
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Because, in common with the other fact skeptics, I stressed the effects of many
non-rule ingredients in the making of court decisions, several critics complained
that I cynically sneered at legal rules, considered them unreal or useless…. But the
rules, statutory or judge-made, are not self-operative. They are frustrated, inoperative, whenever, due to faulty fact-finding in trial courts, they are applied to nonexistent facts. Is the highly moral rule against murder actually enforced when a
court goes wrong on the facts and convicts an innocent man? What of the rule
against fraud when a court, through a mistake of fact, decides that a fraud-doer
was guiltless of fraud?33

Frank is speaking not merely of a court’s role in determining the
legal significance of facts found by the jury,34 but also its occasional
role as the finder of fact. Of course, to the extent that it is a jury that
acts as fact-finder, Frank points to it as a source of discretion.35
Frank’s fact-skepticism helps explain not merely the scope of his
claims about judicial discretion – including his claims that discretion
is greater at trial than on appeal36 – but also his emphasis on the
idiosyncrasies of a judge’s personality. He makes it clear that it is a
judge’s judgments about the credibility of evidence (and particularly
witnesses), not his judgments about the legal consequences of
established facts, that are most influenced by his personality:
To avoid misunderstanding, I must say emphatically that when I speak of the
obscure influences – reflecting the trial judge’s life history – which affect his
decisions, I refer primarily to his biases and predilections not with respect to the
rules … but with respect to the witnesses. I mean the trial judge’s plus or minus
reactions to women, or red-headed women, or spinsters, or to bearded men, or
men with squints or nervous mannerisms, or to Catholics, or Masons, or
Republicans, or labor leaders, when any such persons testify.37

Here too, one can question whether judges actually have discretion. It is true that determinate legal rules cannot recommend a
unique decision to a judge acting as a fact-finder, since they can make
no recommendation about what the facts of the case are. With
respect to these legal rules, therefore, the judge might be said to
have discretion. But if the evidence presented is rationally determinate
33
Frank, supra note 23, at xxvii (preface to sixth printing). Fact-skepticism is a particularly strong
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(in the sense that it justifies a unique conclusion concerning the
facts), the judge, it would seem, still lacks discretion.38
At times Frank appears to argue that the evidence presented to a
judge is usually rationally indeterminate.39 But he most often focuses
on judicial bias when engaging in fact-finding – that is, upon causal
indeterminacy that would exist even if the evidence were rationally
determinate. Such causal indeterminacy does not suggest that there
is judicial discretion, except to the extent that it draws upon the
argument from judicial supremacy, discussed above. Judges, Frank
might be arguing, have discretion as fact-finders even when the
evidence is rationally determinate, because their erroneous factual
findings are binding, unless overturned on appeal.
But, once again, the issue is not whether Frank persuasively argues that judges acting as fact-finders have discretion. My point is
solely that these claims are compatible with Leiter’s moderate
reading of the realists’ indeterminacy thesis. Nothing in Frank’s
argument suggests that there is global legal indeterminacy in the
sense identified by Leiter.
E. Philosophical Anarchism
The realists also suggest that the law is globally indeterminate when
they insist that recourse to moral considerations in adjudication is
inescapable. Here is an example from Walter Wheeler Cook:
[T]he use [of rules] never can be really mechanical; [] the danger in continuing to
deceive ourselves into believing that we are merely ‘‘applying’’ the old rule or
principle to ‘‘a new case’’ by purely deductive reasoning lies in the fact that as the
real thought-process is thus obscured, we fail to realize that our choice is really
being guided by considerations of social and economic policy or ethics.40

Felix Cohen says much the same thing:
What moral a court ought to draw from past cases is always a moral question. It is
the function of ethics to bring to bear upon such questions a sound sense of
human values. Logic cannot take the place of ethics in this service.41
38
Notice that the relevant burden of persuasion can result in a decision concerning the facts being
rationally determinate, even when the evidence presented by both sides leaves the question of what
actually happened in doubt. For example, if the plaintiff has this burden and the evidence is insufficient
to prove the plaintiff’s factual allegations, the court must decide for the defendant concerning the facts.
39
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These passages appear to be counterexamples to Leiter’s reading.
To repeat, for Leiter the Core Claim of legal realism is a descriptive
theory of adjudication, according to which ‘judges reach decisions
based upon what they think would be fair on the facts of the case,
rather than on the basis of the applicable rules of law’ (22). As we
have seen, Leiter believes that the Core Claim applies only locally, to
those cases – such as those brought on appeal – in which the law is
rationally indeterminate. One would expect, therefore, for the realists to claim that considerations of fairness, and other extra-legal
considerations of a moral nature, are relevant to adjudication only
locally as well. But they clearly argue that recourse to moral considerations is a global phenomenon.
But these comments are compatible with Leiter’s reading, if they
are understood as concerning the question of whether a judge
morally ought to adjudicate in accordance with the law. Let us
assume that a judge is deciding a case in which the law is rationally
determinate. If she issues the decision uniquely identified by the law,
she is not merely engaging in a form of theoretical reasoning. She is
acting in a way that has important consequences for others. Moral
considerations might demand that she disobey the law – even that
she do so surreptitiously. By applying the law, she is making the
moral judgment (even if unconsciously) that considerations recommending disobedience are not dispositive.
The use of moral reasoning in legal decisions is therefore a global
phenomenon. But this moral reasoning is compatible with Leiter’s
reading of the realists’ indeterminacy claims. Leiter’s concern is the
realists’ views about the law’s propositional indeterminacy – that is,
the extent to which the law fails to describe the unique decision a
judge ought to arrive at. And nothing about the fact that judges
must always reason morally about whether the law should be followed suggests that the propositional indeterminacy of the law is
global.
Leiter denies that the realists were concerned about judges’ moral
duties to apply the law: ‘[O]ne is hard-pressed’, he claims, ‘to find the
Realists expressing much interest in questions of political obligation!’
(118, n. 68). His conclusion is unfortunate, because it threatens his
own interpretation of the realists. If the moral considerations that the
realists insist are inescapable in adjudication are not about whether
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the judge should adjudicate in accordance with the law, then they
would appear to concern how gaps created by the law’s indeterminacy should be filled. But that means that the realists must have
thought that the law was globally indeterminate.
In order to respond to Leiter’s concerns, however, I will offer
evidence that at least three realists – Cohen, Cook, and Frank – gave
substantial attention to judges’ political obligations.
1. Cohen
The argument that the mere existence of law cannot morally justify
adjudication in accordance with the law is particularly prominent in
the writings of Felix Cohen. Cohen acknowledges that by issuing a
decision recommended by the law a judge will act in a way that is
consistent. But whether consistency should be pursued is a moral
question that is not answered by the law’s existence:
[T]he ethical value of certainty and predictability in law may outweigh more
immediate ethical values, but this is no denial of the ethical nature of the problem.
Consistency … is relevant to such a problem only as an indication of the interest in
legal certainty, and its value and significance are ethical rather than logical. The
question, then, of how far one ought to consider precedent and statute in coming
to a legal decision is purely ethical. The proposition that courts ought always to
decide ‘in accordance with precedent or statute’ is an ethical proposition the truth
of which can be demonstrated only by showing that in every case the following of
precedent or statute does less harm than any possible alternative.42

Much of Cohen’s article ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach’ (the most cited article by any legal realist43) is
devoted to rejecting the view that the existence of a statute or
precedent on its own gives the judge a moral reason to adjudicate as it
recommends.44 Cohen argues that when the natural law view –
exemplified for Cohen by Blackstone45 – is rejected ‘[t]he ghostworld of supernatural legal entities to whom courts delegate the
moral responsibility of deciding cases vanishes; in its place we see
legal concepts as patterns of judicial behavior, behavior which affects
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human lives for better or worse and is therefore subject to moral
criticism’.46 The mistaken belief that laws give judges moral reasons
to adjudicate ‘hides from judicial eyes the ethical character of every
judicial question, and thus serves to perpetuate class prejudices and
uncritical moral assumptions which could not survive the sunlight of
free ethical controversy’.47
Of course, as Cohen himself recognized, there are many very
good moral reasons for adjudicating as laws recommend, for
example, because this will protect ‘human expectations based
upon past decisions, the stability of economic transactions, and []
the maintenance of order and simplicity in our legal system’.48
But the fact remains that these are moral arguments that cannot
be answered simply by appeal to legal rules, no matter how
determinate.
2. Cook
The same theme is prominent in the writings of the realist (and great
choice-of-law scholar) Walter Wheeler Cook. Consider a simple
choice-of-law case: A New York court is entertaining Jones v. Smith.
Under English law, there is no statute of frauds. Under New York
law, there is. Both Jones and Smith are domiciled in England,
Blackacre is located there, the agreement was entered into there, and
Smith’s payment was to take place there. Under the traditional
theory of choice of law at the time that the realists were writing,
Jones would be taken to have a vested right, which would obligate the
New York court to apply English law.49
Cook rejected the vested rights approach. The heart of his
argument was a prediction theory of law:
‘‘Right,’’ ‘‘duty,’’ and other names for ‘‘legal relations’’ are therefore not names of
objects or entities which have an existence apart from the behavior of the officials
in question, but terms by means of which we describe to each other what
prophecies we make as to the probable occurrence of a certain sequence of events
– the behavior of the officials.50
46
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To say that something is the law of England therefore is ‘merely a
more or less convenient shorthand way of saying that, on the basis of
certain observations of past phenomena, we predict certain future
behavior of the appropriate English officials’.51 Although I will discuss Cook’s prediction theory of law in greater detail later, for our
present purposes it is enough to note that Cook denies that the
existence of an English legal right gives a New York court a reason to
apply English law absent moral considerations: ‘The decision [to
apply foreign law] thus appears not as an inevitable outcome from
fixed premises (that the forum is enforcing an obligatio created by
foreign law …), but for what it is … – a practical result based upon
reasons of policy’.52 Of course there are very good reasons – such as
the expectations of the parties – for the New York court to apply
English law in Jones v. Smith. But that does not change the moral
nature of this decision. Like Cohen, Cook argues that although
adjudication in accordance with law (in this case, English law) would
be consistent, whether consistency should be pursued remains a
moral question.
One might interpret Cook’s argument not as concerning the
moral considerations that come into play in a New York court’s
decision, but rather domestic legal considerations. A New York court
should apply English law when New York choice-of-law rules say so.
The policies that the New York court must consider in choosing
whether to apply English law are those expressed in these domestic
legal rules. But Cook argues that the application of law even in
domestic cases ‘is really being guided by considerations of social and
economic policy or ethics’.53 Domestic legal rights, like foreign legal
rights, are the prediction of official behavior.54 To say that a New
York legal right exists is to make a descriptive claim about the
probable actions of New York officials. This fact does not obligate
even a New York judge to adjudicate in the same manner, absent a
moral argument for obedience.
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3. Frank
The political obligation of judges is also a prominent theme in the
writings of Jerome Frank. Like Cook and Cohen, Frank uses the
prediction theory of law to argue that legal rules lack ‘authoritativeness’:
Nor can any rule of law, by whomever made, be ‘‘authoritative.’’ For whether a
rule be considered as an historical summary – a brief, generalized statement of
what courts have done – or as a prediction of what courts will do, it cannot be
final, binding, dictatorial. That is, the notion of ‘‘authoritativeness’’ is alien to the
character of a rule, looked at either as a bit of historical description or as a bit of
prophecy. The announcement of a rule by a court cannot, therefore, confer upon
it an authoritative quality.55

The ‘authoritativeness’ that Frank refuses to attribute to legal
rules is clearly moral authority. Frank denies that legal rules are
‘entitled to acceptance or obedience’, ‘peremptory’, ‘imperative’,
‘compulsory’,56 or that they have an ‘obedience-compelling character’.57 Moral judgment is required even when the law is rationally
determinate.
This issue of a judge’s political obligations is essential to making
sense of Frank’s reliance on Freudian psychoanalysis in Law and the
Modern Mind. Leiter claims that Frank used Freud to explain why a
judge’s personality generates unpredictable decisions: ‘[W]e explain
the decision in terms of the ‘hunch’; and we explain the ‘hunch’
psychoanalytically (at least for Frank)’ (45).58 He attributes this position to Frank even though it is paradoxical: If Freudian psychoanalysis really could explain judges’ personalities, decisions would
not be unpredictable after all.
This gets Frank wrong. To be sure, he speaks of the idiosyncrasies
– the hunches – that give rise to judicial decisions and findings of fact.
55
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Frank, supra note 23, at 298.
Ibid. at 287.
Ibid. at 289.
Or again:

[F]or Frank, judicial decisions are determined, so that, in reality, there is no room for judicial choice. It is
just that both judges themselves, and we as observers of their behavior, will find it hard, if not
impossible, to identify the determinants. For that, the hard work of Freudian psychoanalysis is required.
Brian Leiter, ‘Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence’, Texas Law Review 76
(1997): 267, 280, n. 66 (emphasis mine). Leiter makes the same claim elsewhere. Leiter, supra note 8, at
271 (Frank accepted a ‘Freudian psychic determinism’ concerning judicial decisions).
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But he does not use Freud to investigate what those hunches are.
Indeed, Frank himself rejected Leiter’s reading. To those who interpreted him as ‘tr[ying] to explain the uncertainty in law in terms of
Freudian complexes’, he responded, ‘Of course I did nothing of the
kind. I sought to uncover one of the roots of a yearning for an
unattainable legal certainty’.59 What Frank explains through Freudian
psychoanalysis is a certain jurisprudential view. The question is why
judges are committed to the ‘self-delusion’ that ‘they are merely
applying the commands given them by some existing external
authority’.60 This belief is a delusion, first of all, because in many cases
the law is indeterminate. But it is also a delusion because even when
only one decision is recommended by the law, a judge must make the
autonomous moral choice about whether the law should be followed.
This belief in the certainty and compulsory character of the law is
the ‘basic myth’61 around which the book is organized. It is because
this myth is a ‘stubborn illusion’62 that Frank resorts to Freud. Why,
if the myth is false, are so many judges committed to it? Their
pathological unwillingness to take responsibility for their moral
judgment begs for a Freudian explanation. Frank argues that ‘they
have not yet relinquished the childish need for an authoritative
father and unconsciously have tried to find in the law a substitute for
those attributes of firmness, sureness, certainty and infallibility
ascribed in childhood to the father’.63 ‘They must rid themselves of
this reliance on a non-existent guide, they must learn the virtue, the
power and the practical worth of self-authority’.64
4. The Rejection of Natural Law
In denying that the existence of law necessarily imposes upon a
judge a moral duty to adjudicate as the law demands, the realists
were reacting against the prevailing natural law tradition.65 At the
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time the realists were writing, there was often no clear distinction
drawn between the law (particularly the common law) of a jurisdiction and the standard of behavior recommended by morality. For
this reason, the fact that something was the law was commonly
taken as entailing a moral obligation on judges to adjudicate as the
law commands. The realists rightly rejected this notion.
Furthermore, the passages from the realists quoted above can be
understood as taking an even stronger position. One can deny that the
law necessarily gives judges an all-things-considered moral obligation
to adjudicate as the law commands, while insisting that it necessarily
gives them a prima facie duty, that is, a duty that can be overridden by
other moral considerations. But the realists appeared to reject even the
prima facie duty. After all, the existence conditions for law that they
employ – namely patterns of judicial or official behavior – are unlikely
to necessarily entail the existence of such a duty.
So understood, the realists were philosophically prescient, for
philosophical anarchism – the view that the existence of law does not
entail even a prima facie moral duty of obedience – has only recently
become the majority view among philosophers.66 Indeed, by
applying philosophical anarchism to judges, the realists are still ahead
of the curve, for many philosophers of law remain committed to the
goal – fruitless to my mind – of showing that the existence of law
gives judges and other officials a prima facie moral reason to adjudicate as the law commands.67
II. THE PREDICTION THEORIES OF LAW

To repeat, Leiter’s reading of the realists’ indeterminacy thesis can be
defended. Leiter is concerned with the realists’ claims about the
propositional indeterminacy of the law – that is, the failure of the law
to recommend a unique decision to a judge. He is right that the
realists thought that the law’s propositional indeterminacy was a
local phenomenon – even if they might not have adopted the particular appellate limitation that he attributes to them.

66

William A. Edmundson, ‘State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law’, Legal Theory 10 (2004): 215.
I discuss this matter in Michael Steven Green, ‘Legal Realism as Theory of Law’, William and Mary
Law Review 46 (2005): 1915, 1939–1956.
67

LEITER ON THE LEGAL REALISTS

Leiter’s reading of the realists is less easily defended as we move on to
his assertion that the realists – Felix Cohen ‘arguably’ excepted (70) – did
not hold a prediction theory of law.68 Leiter considers the matter largely
in the context of H.L.A. Hart’s critique of the realists’ ‘rule-skepticism’ in
Chapter Seven of The Concept of Law. Leiter distinguishes between three
versions of the rule-skepticism that Hart attributed to the realists. One
version, which Leiter thinks can be defended, is empirical rule-skepticism.
The empirical rule skeptic argues that ‘rules of law do not make
much (causal) difference to how courts decide cases’ (69). As we have
seen, Leiter thinks that the realists were right to be empirical rule
skeptics, because the law is rationally indeterminate, at least in appellate
cases.
Another version is conceptual rule-skepticism, which offers a nonstandard account of the concept of law. The account is non-standard
because it rejects what Leiter calls ‘the Simple View’, according to
which ‘certain prior official acts (like legislative enactments and
judicial decisions) constitute ‘law’ (even if they do not exhaust it)’
(69). In its place, the conceptual rule skeptic presents an ‘‘account of
the concept of law, according to which, ‘The law is just a prediction
of what a court will do’ or ‘The law is just whatever a court says it is
on the present occasion’’’ (69). Although Leiter occasionally
describes this as a ‘predictive’ theory of law (17, 71), it is more
accurately described as a decision theory, since the law is ultimately reduced to judicial decisions, not predictions of those decisions. If a court issues a surprising decision that is contrary to one’s
prediction, I take it that for the conceptual rule skeptic, as Leiter
understands him, the law is the decision rather than the prediction.
Predictions of judicial decisions are relevant only in determining
what the law, as the conceptual rule skeptic understands it, is likely
to be.
Leiter briefly mentions a third version of rule-skepticism, which
denies that there are any rules (68, n. 38). Since both conceptual
rule-skepticism and this no-rules version, it seems, speak of law in
terms of judicial decisions, it is not clear in what sense they are
different. The solution to this puzzle probably rests, however, in
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Leiter’s observation that the no-rules version is incompatible with
the assertion that there are decisions of courts. A complete reduction of law to judicial decisions is incoherent, because ‘the existence
of a court entails the existence of secondary rules conferring jurisdiction on a changing succession of individuals and so making
their decisions authoritative’ (68, n. 38).69 The law differentiating
judicial decisions from, say, statements that I make in my
living room cannot, on pain of vicious circularity, be itself reduced to
judicial decisions.70 My guess, therefore, is that Leiter understands
conceptual rule skepticism, unlike the no-rules version, as allowing
that some statutes and constitutional provisions are law – namely
those necessary to identify judicial decisions.71 The remaining statutes and constitutional provisions, however, are not law.
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A. The Decision Theory of Law
Although evidence of a decision theory of law can be found in a
number of the realists’ writings,72 the theory is most prominent in
Frank’s Law and the Modern Mind:
Rules, whether stated by judges or others, whether in statutes, opinions or textbooks by learned authors, are not the Law, but are only some among many of the
sources to which judges go in making the law of the cases tried before them.73
The law, therefore, consists of decisions, not of rules. If so, then whenever a judge
decides a case he is making law. The most conservative or timid judge, deny it
though he may, is constantly engaged in law-making.74
For any particular lay person, the law, with respect to any particular set of facts, is
a decision of a court with respect to those facts so far as that decision affects that
particular person. Until a court has passed on those facts no law on that subject is
yet in existence. Prior to such a decision, the only law available is the opinion of
lawyers as to the law relating to that person and to those facts. Such opinion is not
actually law but only a guess as to what a court will decide.75
All [] decisions are law. The fact that courts render these decisions makes them
law. There is no mysterious entity apart from these decisions. If the judges in any
case come to a ‘wrong’ result and give forth a decision which is discordant with
their own or anyone else’s rules, their decision is none the less law.76
A rule tells something about law, but is not law. For, to repeat, law is what has
happened or what will happen in concrete cases.77

One of Frank’s motivations for offering the decision theory was
clearly judicial supremacy.78 As we have seen, in legal systems with weak
72
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judicial supremacy, concrete judgments are legally binding even if they
involve erroneous interpretations or applications of a legal rule. Officials
may not refuse to enforce a judgment simply because the court got the
law wrong. Furthermore, if there is strong judicial supremacy, not only
the judgment, but also the erroneous interpretation of the law in the
court’s written opinion is binding, in the sense that officials are bound to
respect that interpretation in future situations.
That Frank’s decision theory of law depended upon weak rather
than strong judicial supremacy is evident in his discussion of John
Chipman Gray. Although Gray argued that statutes are only sources
of law, rather than being law themselves,79 he reduced the law to
judicial interpretations of such sources, rather than to concrete decisions: ‘[S]tatutes do not interpret themselves; their meaning is
declared by the courts, and it is with the meaning declared by the courts,
and with no other meaning, that they are imposed upon the community as
Law’.80 Frank criticizes Gray on the ground that judges have weak
judicial supremacy even with respect to past judicial interpretations
of law. A judgment that is contrary to a past interpretation remains
binding (unless overturned on appeal):
Gray defines law not as what courts decide but as the ‘‘rules which the courts lay
down for the determination of legal rights and duties’’ or ‘‘the rules of decision
which the courts lay down’’. If a court in deciding a particular case fails to apply
the ‘‘rule generally followed’’, that decision is not law…. Now this stress on
generality as the essence of law is a remnant of the old myth. And a vigorous
remnant.81

Because a judgment is legally binding even if it violates past
interpretations of legal rules, the law, Frank argued, consists of the
judgment rather than the interpretation. The interpretation cannot
be treated as the law, because its violation has no legal effect in the
face of a contrary judgment by a court:
Of course those old gentlemen in deciding cases do not follow their own whims,
but derive their views from many sources. And among those sources are not only
statutes, precedents, customs and the like, but the rules which other courts have
announced when deciding cases. Those rules are no more law than statutes are
law. For, after all, rules are merely words and those words can get into action only
79
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through decisions…. The shape in which rules are imposed on the community is
those rules as translated into concrete decisions.82

B. Leiter on the Decision Theory
Leiter argues, however, that Frank’s statements should not be
understood as offering a theory of law.83 He was concerned instead
with describing what about the law is of interest to a lawyer and her
client:
How, then, do we understand [the realists’] talk about ‘‘predicting’’ what courts
will do?… This is not a claim about the ‘‘concept’’ of law, but rather a claim about
how it is useful to think about law for attorneys who must advise clients what to
do. For your client, the franchisee in Connecticut, does not simply want to know
what the rule on the books in Connecticut says; he wants to know what will
happen when he takes the franchisor to court. So from the practical perspective of
the franchisee, what one wants to know about the ‘‘law’’ is what, in fact, the
courts will do when confronted with the franchisee’s grievance. That is all the law
that matters to the client, all the law that matters to the lawyer advising that client.
And that is all, I take it, the Realists wanted to emphasize (71).

From the perspective of the judge deciding a case, Leiter argues,
the realists were committed to the Simple View, in which statutes
and the like can be law.
Leiter is correct that when Frank speaks of predictions of future
decisions, he claims to be offering only ‘what, in a rough sense, the
law means to the average man of our times when he consults his
lawyer’.84 But that does not mean that he thought the Simple View
applied once we adopted a judge’s perspective. Indeed, Frank
explicitly states that from that perspective the law is whatever the
judge decides. For example, in ‘Are Judges Human?’, Frank describes
the following passage as made ‘from the point of view of a judge’:
Whenever a judge decides a case he is making law: the law of that case, not the
law of future cases not yet before him. What the judge does and what he says may
82
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somewhat influence what other judges will do or say in other cases. But what the
other judges decide in those other cases, as a result of whatever influences, will be
the law in those other cases. The law of any case is what the judge decides.85

And in Law and the Modern Mind, he argues:
From the point of view of the practical work of the lawyer, law may fairly be said
to be past decisions (as to past events which have been judged) and predictions as
to future decisions. From the point of view of the judge, the law may fairly be said
to be the judging process or the power to pass judgment.86

Leiter also argues that the realists could not be committed to
conceptual rule skepticism, because it is incompatible with their
claims about legal indeterminacy. The realists claimed that the law –
that is, statutes and the like – is rationally indeterminate, in the sense
that it fails to identify to a judge a unique decision. They therefore
must have been committed to the Simple View, according to which
statutes can be the law. Indeed, Leiter argues, they presumed
something like a positivist theory of law, akin to Hart’s, under which
legal rules are identified on the basis of their pedigree:87
Any argument for indeterminacy, then, presupposes some view about the
boundaries of the class of legal reasons. When Oliphant argues, for example, that
the promise-not-to-compete cases are decided not by reference to law, but by
reference to uncodified norms prevalent in the commercial culture in which the
disputes arose, this only shows that the law is indeterminate on the assumption
that the normative reasons the courts are actually relying upon are not themselves
legal reasons. (72)
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But it does not follow from the fact that the realists employed the
Simple View when making their indeterminacy claims that they did
not offer an alternative theory of law as more adequate. Frank drew a
distinction between the law as he thought it should be understood,
and ‘formal law’88 or ‘Bealish Law’89 (after Joseph H. Beale). Llewellyn too described as ‘paper rules’ those rules which ‘have been
treated, traditionally, as rules of law’.90 The realists’ indeterminacy
claims concerned this formal law or paper rules.
Finally, Leiter argues that the attribution to the realists of any
account of the concept of law is a mistake:
The question is whether, in [talking about prediction], they are fairly read as
offering an analysis of the concept of law. Only Hart’s grossly anachronistic
reading suggests an affirmative answer. The idea that philosophy involves ‘conceptual analysis’ via the analysis of language is an artifact of Anglo-American
analytic philosophy of the twentieth century; indeed, as practiced by Hart, it really
reflects the influence of fashionable views in philosophy of language current at
Oxford in the 1940s and 1950s. The Realists were not philosophers, let alone
analytic philosophers, let alone students of G.E. Moore, Russell, and the early
Wittgenstein, let alone colleagues of J.L. Austin. (70–71, see also 104)

But simply because the realists were not engaging in the type of
ordinary-language philosophy common at Oxford in the mid-twentieth century does not mean that they were not attempting to come
up with a general theory of the law by attending to the meaning of
the word ‘law’. For example, in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, published in 1832, John Austin offered the following as a
‘definition of positive law’:
Every positive law (or every law simply and strictly so called) is set, directly or
circuitously, by a sovereign individual or body, to a member or members of the
independent political society wherein its author is supreme.91

Plenty of people think that this is a lousy theory of law, but none,
to my knowledge, deny that it is a general theory of law at all, even
though John Austin too was not a colleague of J.L. Austin (no
relation) at Oxford. Austin was quite clearly seeking to offer an
88
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account of the essential features of law wherever it occurs and was
doing so well before the mid-twentieth century. The same can be
said about the decision theory of law, which Frank offered – if
provisionally – as a ‘definition’ of law.92
Indeed, Leiter’s claim of anachronism is undermined precisely by
those realists who resisted offering such a general theory. Llewellyn, for
example, refused to ‘‘fram[e] any concept of ‘law’’’93 or ‘to attempt a
definition of law’.94 And he regretted those passages in which he expressed the decision theory.95 Eighteen years after the original publication of Law and the Modern Mind, Frank too admitted, ‘I seriously
blundered when I offered my own definition of the word Law’.96 These
passages show that the project of providing a general theory of law on
the basis of the meaning of the word ‘law’ was not unknown at the time
the realists were writing and that the realists, at times, engaged in it.
I think that the conclusion is inescapable that Frank – as well as a
number of other realists – offered a decision theory of law. Frank
was right, however, to regret it, since the theory is fatally flawed. As
a fundamental matter, the weak judicial supremacy upon which the
theory is based is itself a contingent legal matter. There might be
legal systems in which officials are not obligated to respect judgments involving erroneous interpretations of the law. The decision
theory cannot, therefore, be a generally applicable theory of law, for it
does not apply to legal systems without weak judicial supremacy.
Furthermore, the theory in its no-rules version is incomplete, for it is
unable to account for law that identifies judicial decisions. Finally,
even in legal systems with weak judicial supremacy, judgments
involving wildly unreasonable interpretations of statutes or constitutional provisions are not binding upon other officials. Officials do
not have to wait for such judgments to be overturned on appeal or
abrogated by legislative action to refuse to give them effect. Given
that statutes put some legal limit on a court’s discretion they must
themselves be understood as law.
92
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C. The Prediction Theory of Law
But the realists offered another ‘prediction’ theory of law. For most
realists, this second theory was muddled together with the decision
theory. But it was offered in an unadulterated form by Felix Cohen
and Walter Wheeler Cook:
[W]e must as always guard ourselves against thinking of our assertion that ‘‘rights’’
and other legal relations ‘‘exist’’ or have been ‘‘enforced’’ as more than a conventional way of describing past and predicting future behavior of human beings –
judges and other officials.97
Our statements of the ‘‘law’’ are therefore ‘‘true’’ if they accurately and as simply
as possible describe the past behavior and predict the future behavior of these
societal agents [e.g. judges and legislators].98
Consider the elementary legal question: ‘‘Is there a contract?’’ When the realist asks
this question, he is concerned with the actual behavior of courts. For the realist, the
contractual relationship, like the law in general, is a function of judicial decisions….
So conceived, any answer to the question ‘‘Is there a contract’’ must be in the
nature of a prophecy, based, like other prophecies, upon past and present facts.99
[L]egal rules are simply formulae describing uniformities of judicial decision.100
Applied within the field of law itself, [the functional] approach leads to a definition
of legal concepts, rules, and institutions in terms of judicial decisions or other acts
of state-force.101

Cook and Cohen argue that a statement about the law is ultimately a
claim about regularities in behavior exhibited by judges (and other
officials) in the jurisdiction. The theory is put in terms of prediction,
because in making a claim about present or future law, one is
making a prediction that the relevant regularities obtain or will
obtain.
This is not the decision theory of law. Under the decision theory,
the law concerning certain facts is the judgment that will be issued if
those facts are adjudicated. In the passages above, the law is not
reduced to how an individual judge decides. The law consists instead of
regularities of judicial and other official behavior. If an individual judge
decides contrary to the relevant regularities, the judge’s decision did
97
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not conform to the law. For example, if the judge deciding Jones v.
Smith holds for Jones, despite the jury’s having found that the contract
was not in writing, the decision would be contrary to the law, because
most judges – appealing to the statute of frauds – would have found for
Smith. I have not been able to find evidence of a decision theory of law
in either Cohen’s or Cook’s writings. What is more, Cohen explicitly
criticizes Frank for adopting a decision theory.102
As we have seen, Leiter argues that the realists’ statements about
prediction concern only what about the law is of interest to a lawyer
and her client. But this will not do. A lawyer and her client are not
interested in regularities of judicial behavior, except to the extent that
they help them predict how the particular judge hearing their case will
decide. If they know the judge’s decision will diverge from the regularities, they are concerned only about the decision. But the prediction
theory insists that the law consists of the regularities, not the decision.
Furthermore, Cook explicitly described the prediction theory as
applying, not just to the litigants, but to a judge: The theory, he
claimed, is an ‘examin[ation] into the meaning of the terms ‘law’ and
‘right’ as they are commonly used by judges and lawyers’.103 And
even Leiter admits that Cohen ‘arguably’ offered the prediction
theory as a theory of law (70), not simply as an account of what
about the law is interesting to a lawyer and her client. (It is awkward
that Leiter’s ‘philosophical reconstruction of Legal Realism’ (21), should
relegate to the sidelines the one realist who had a Ph.D. in philosophy – from Harvard.)
I will argue that in offering the prediction theory, Cook and
Cohen were attempting to provide a positivist theory of law. The
best way of appreciating this fact is by comparing it with a ruleof-recognition theory like Hart’s.
Hart believed that in every legal system there is a rule of recognition, which sets out the ultimate criteria of legality within the
system. This ultimate rule exists by virtue of its general, although
not necessarily universal, acceptance by officials (judges, legislators,
sheriffs, and the like) for identifying those norms that may be backed
up by official force.104 Official acceptance of the rule of recognition
need not be moral. It could be based on ‘calculations of long-term
102
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interest;… an unreflecting inherited or traditional attitude; or the
mere wish to do as others do’.105 Hart also argued that the existence of a legal system requires that the norms identified by the rule
of recognition be efficacious, in the sense that they are generally –
although not necessarily always – obeyed by the population.106 Let
us call the facts that Hart believed stand at the basis of a legal system
rule-of-recognition facts.
Hart’s theory is a form of positivism. One distinguishing feature
of positivism is the social fact thesis, according to which the existence
of criteria of legality in a legal system is ultimately a matter of social
facts.107 In the case of Hart’s theory, the relevant social facts are ruleof-recognition facts. Hart’s theory also satisfies what is often thought
to be another distinguishing feature of positivism, the separability
thesis.108 In its most plausible form, this thesis is that the content of
the law need not overlap with the content of morality, or, as Hart
puts it, ‘it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or
satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often
done so’.109
Cook’s and Cohen’s prediction theory satisfies the social fact
thesis, since under their theory whether an item counts as law is
ultimately grounded in social facts about regularities in official
behavior. Furthermore, they were attracted to the prediction theory
precisely because the separability thesis followed. Both Cook and
Cohen argued that an advantage of Holmes’s definition of law as
‘prophecies of what courts will do in fact’110 is that it allowed for a
distinction between law and morality.111
This does not mean that they thought that Holmes’s formulation
was perfect. One problem was that it failed to make clear whether
the law was the decision that a particular judge would arrive in a
case – as the decision theory insists – or whether it was determined
by the regularities of judicial (and other official) behavior that stand
at the foundation of a legal system. Cook and Cohen aside, this
105
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ambiguity caused serious confusion among the realists. But, while
recognizing that Holmes’s theory was inadequate as it stood, Cohen
believed that the theory was on the right track in satisfying the
separation thesis:
‘‘What courts do’’ is not entirely devoid of ambiguity…. But these sources of
ambiguity in Holmes’ definition of law are peripheral rather than central, and
easily remedied. They are, therefore, far less dangerous sources of confusion than
the basic ambiguity inherent in classical definitions of law which involve a confusion between what is and what ought to be.112

Some amendments that Cook and Cohen offered to Holmes’s
theory brought it closer to Hart’s. For example, they insisted that
one should look not merely to regularities of judicial behavior, but
also of the behavior of officials more generally.113 Indeed, Cohen
recognized that one cannot identify a judicial decision without
looking to the behavior of non-judicial officials. To determine
whether a decision is binding, one must look to ‘certain predictable
uniformities of official behavior, e.g. that a sheriff or marshall will
enforce the decision, in one way or another, over a period of
time’.114 Furthermore, Cook recognized that the existence of a legal
system also requires that the population generally abide by enforced
norms.115
But some important differences between the prediction theory
and Hart’s remain. One has to do with their semantic account of
legal statements. For the realists, a statement about the law can be
reduced to a statement about social facts. For simplicity’s sake, let us
assume for the moment that the realists thought that the relevant
social facts were the rule-of-recognition facts emphasized by Hart. If
so, the statement ‘The Securities Exchange Act is valid law’, would
be roughly reducible to ‘The Securities Exchange Act satisfies the
enforceability criteria generally accepted by officials in the United
States’. But Hart disagrees with this account. For Hart, ‘The Securities Exchange Act is valid law’ is an internal legal statement,116
112
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whereas the sociological statement about officials’ enforceability
criteria is external.117
One distinguishing feature of an internal legal statement for Hart
is that the speaker expresses (rather than describes) her acceptance of
the rule of recognition as standard for her behavior.118 This explains
why she uses normative terminology and takes the statement to
entail the presence of reasons for action.119 Furthermore, she presupposes (but, once again, does not describe) the existence of rule-ofrecognition facts.120 Indeed, Hart criticized the legal realists for
treating legal statements as purely sociological descriptions:
One who makes an internal statement concerning the validity of a particular rule
of a system may be said to presuppose the truth of the external statement of fact
that the system is generally efficacious. For the normal use of internal statements is
in such a context of general efficacy. It would however be wrong to say that
statements of validity ‘‘mean’’ that the system is generally efficacious.121

Although Hart emphasizes in this passage the inadequacy of reducing internal legal statements to statements about efficacy, he would
be no more satisfied if they were reduced to statements about ruleof-recognition facts more generally. Someone who speaks of such
facts, he argues, has ceased to talk about legal validity from within
the internal perspective.122
It is not clear, however, why Hart insists that someone making an
internal legal statement must presuppose rather than describe ruleof-recognition facts.123 Indeed, Hart himself admitted that ‘[i]f the
truth of this presupposition [of rule-of-recognition facts] were
doubted, it could be established by reference to actual practice: to
the way in which courts identify what is to count as law, and to the
general acceptance of or acquiescence in these identifications’.124
Internal legal statements might be understood, therefore, as
117
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describing the existence of the relevant rule-of-recognition facts,
provided that they also expressed acceptance (although not necessarily moral acceptance) of the rule of recognition as a standard of
conduct.125 Even if Hart made this concession, however, the realists’
semantic account of legal statements remains importantly different.
The realists understand legal statements as purely descriptive. For
Hart, internal legal statements are normative, in the sense that they
retain an important expressive element.
As an account of actual usage, Hart’s approach is closer to the
truth. But the realists’ appeared to recognize, at least at times, that
they were suggesting that legal language be reformed. Cohen, for
example, admitted that legal language can perform an expressive
function,126 but he recommended the prediction theory, since
otherwise a judge ‘is apt to forget the social forces which mold the
law and the social ideals by which the law is to be judged’.127
Although I cannot address the matter in detail here, the realists’
proposed reform has much to recommend it. As we have seen, Hart
thought that internal legal statements express a wide variety of
motivations for conformity to the rule of recognition, motivations of
very different normative significance. In addition to moral reasons
for conformity, there are ‘calculations of long-term interest;… an
unreflecting inherited or traditional attitude; or the mere wish to do
as others do’.128 The use of a single set of normative legal language
to cover all these reasons for action discourages clarity about what
one’s actual reasons are and whether they are good ones.
The final and most significant difference between the realists’
prediction theory and Hart’s has to do with the social facts that Hart
and the realists looked to when identifying law. For Hart, officials’
attitudes – in particular, their acceptance of certain criteria for normenforcement – are crucial. Consider, for example, an obligation of
good faith in contractual dealing, which Karl Llewellyn thought
regularly motivated decisions in contract cases, even though it was
not (until the U.C.C.) a reason explicitly identified as law (30). Under
Hart’s theory, there is no legal obligation of good faith, because this
125
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norm does not satisfy the enforcement criteria identified by judges.
In contrast, it appears that the realists would treat the obligation as
law, because it is regularly employed by judges.
To be sure, in many cases, the realists expressed their prediction
theory without making specific claims about which regularities of
judicial behavior were relevant. It is possible to read them as offering
a rule-of-recognition theory of law that is distinct from Hart’s only in
insisting that statements about the law are (or should be) purely
descriptive rather than expressive. But the realists certainly appeared
to recommend at times that any consideration regularly employed in
adjudication be designated ‘law’, even if it failed to satisfy the rule of
recognition in the legal system.
A possible way of putting matters is that the prediction theory
does not yield a hermeneutic concept of law. As Leiter describes it, a
hermeneutic concept ‘satisfies two conditions: (i) it plays a hermeneutic role, that is, it figures in how humans make themselves and
their practices intelligible to themselves, and (ii) its extension is fixed
by this hermeneutic role’ (173). The concept of law clearly figures in
how humans (particularly officials) understand themselves and their
practices, but the prediction theory does not privilege this selfunderstanding in identifying what is law. Although officials see
themselves as enforcing law on the basis of the criteria in the rule of
recognition, the prediction theory treats these criteria as unimportant in figuring out what is law.
But there is a sense in which the realists’ prediction theory can be
understood as offering a hermeneutic concept of law.129 Llewellyn,
for example, did not understand officials as enforcing an obligation of
good faith in contractual dealing mindlessly. They did so for reasons –
namely their belief that the obligation exists as a moral matter.
Although the prediction theory does not privilege the public selfunderstanding that judges present in their opinions, it may do justice
to their true self-understanding when deciding cases.
This hermeneutic aspect of the prediction theory can be obscured
by the realists’ use of the term ‘prediction’, which makes it appear as
if they were concerned solely with behavioral responses.130 But, as
129
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Leiter notes, few realists adopted a strict behaviorism (24, n. 49).
Most recognized that judges decide on the basis of reasons. The
question was solely what those reasons were and which should be
relevant when identifying law.
Indeed, Hart’s theory of law is as concerned with prediction as the
realists’. For Hart, someone who states that the Securities Exchange
Act is valid law presupposes that the set of rule-of-recognition facts
that have been in place – for example, that American officials look to
promulgation in accordance with the United States Constitution as a
criterion for norm-enforcement – are still there. This presupposition
involves a prediction about official attitudes and behavior. (Although
this prediction is easy to make in normal cases, it can be difficult in a
revolution.) The distinction between Hart’s theory and the realists’ is
not whether social facts concerning officials must be predicted to
identify law, but what the relevant social facts are.
Of course, since the prediction theory is a non-standard theory of
law, Leiter’s observation that the realists did not employ it when
making claims about legal indeterminacy applies. If the obligation of
good faith is the law, then the law is not indeterminate in contract
cases. In arguing that the law is indeed indeterminate in such cases,
the realists must have been employing a standard concept of law,
according to which the obligation of good faith is not the law. But,
once again, the fact that the realists’ indeterminacy claims involved a
standard concept of law – what the realists called ‘paper rules’131 or
‘formal law’132 – does not mean that they did not offer the prediction
theory as a superior alternative. The realists recommended that the
concept of law be revised. It is precisely in explaining this recommendation that Leiter’s reading of the realists as jurisprudential
naturalists is most useful.
III. CONCLUSION

Leiter argues that the realists were prescient jurisprudential naturalists because of an analogy between their descriptive theory of
adjudication and Quine’s naturalized epistemology. The realists’
reaction to our inability to justify judicial decisions by legal reasons,
Leiter argues, is comparable to Quine’s reaction to the failure of
131
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Rudolf Carnap’s epistemological foundationalism, which sought ‘to
show that scientific theories about the physical world are uniquely
justified on the basis of sensory experience’ (36, n. 102). Just as Quine
replaces justification of scientific theories with a descriptive-psychological account of how theories are constructed, so the realists
replaced justification of judicial decisions with a descriptive-psychological account of how judges decide cases. The realists replaced ‘‘the
‘sterile’ foundational program of justifying some one legal outcome
on the basis of the applicable legal reasons, with a descriptive/
explanatory account of what input (that is, what combination of facts
and reasons) produces what output (i.e. what judicial decision)’’ (40).
The theory of adjudication ‘falls into place, for the Realist, as a
chapter of psychology (or anthropology or sociology)’ (40).
The adequacy of Leiter’s claimed analogy can be questioned.
Quine rejected Carnapian foundationalism because it makes philosophically inappropriate demands for the justification of scientific
theories. For Leiter’s analogy to work, one would expect the realists
to have rejected as philosophically inappropriate the attempt to
justify judicial decisions in terms of legal rules. But the realists do not
think that such justification is philosophically inappropriate. It is
hardly ‘sterile’. Indeed, as Leiter himself emphasizes, they thought
legal decisions were usually justified by legal rules, outside of cases
brought on appeal. The realists simply denied that justification
succeeded in some cases.133
What is more important for our purposes, however, is another
element of philosophical naturalism emphasized by Leiter outside of
his discussion of the realists, namely, skepticism about conceptual
analysis. The traditional conception of the philosophical method –
including the method as employed in the philosophy of law – is that
it involves the analysis of the meanings of our terms or the contents
of the concepts associated with these terms. Such analytic statements
are necessarily true. In contrast, synthetic reasoning involves arriving
at truths by appeal to empirical evidence.
Quine rejected the analytic-synthetic distinction. As Leiter puts it:
[Quine] argues that all statements are answerable to experience … that none are
‘‘true in virtue of meaning’’ alone. Those we tend to call ‘‘analytic’’ are simply
133
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those that we are least willing to give up at that particular point in the history of
inquiry: whatever the empirical facts are, we are going to adjust other parts of our
theory of the world to accommodate those facts, before we think about rejecting
the ‘‘analytic’’ statements. (144)

The question arises, therefore, whether philosophy, as distinct
from science, can exist: ‘[T]he collapse of the analytic-synthetic distinction puts all questions into the domain of science because science is
already the domain in which synthetic questions – questions of fact – are
answered’ (146).
The philosophical naturalist takes Quine’s critique of the analyticsynthetic distinction to heart, by recognizing that there is nothing
privileged about one’s intuitions about the nature and scope of a
concept. Instead, philosophers should ‘clarify[] the contours and
extensions of concepts that have been vindicated by their role in
successful explanation and prediction of empirical phenomena’ (184).
Applying this method to the philosophy of law ‘would mean taking
seriously the enormous social scientific literature on law and legal
institutions to see what concept of law figures in the most powerful
explanatory and predictive models of legal phenomena such as
judicial behavior’ (184). The result would be what we can call a
scientistic concept of law.
In one of the richest sections of the book, Leiter considers and
rejects the adoption of a scientistic concept, primarily because he
believes that ‘there is no robust, hence epistemically credible, social
science of adjudication’ (192). He comes to this conclusion as a
statement of his own views concerning what naturalizing the philosophy of law should entail. But he does not consider whether the
realists – convinced that their descriptive account of adjudication was
robust – might have advocated a scientistic concept, in the form of
the prediction theory. Like the philosophical naturalist, the realists
did not privilege our intuitions about the scope of the concept of
law, intuitions that would yield a standard theory of law like Hart’s.
They advocated the prediction theory, because they thought it was
vindicated by social-scientific inquiry into judicial decision-making. If
so, the realists were more naturalists than Leiter himself realizes.
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